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THE CLIENT WHO DID TOO MUCH ∗
Nancy B. Rapoport∗∗
The whole point of the MacGuffin is that it is irrelevant. In
Hitchcock’s own words, the MacGuffin is:
the device, the gimmick, if you will, or the papers the spies are
after. . .[.] The only thing that really matters is that in the picture
the plans, documents or secrets must seem to be of vital
importance to the characters. To me, the narrator, they’re of no
importance whatsoever.
Angus McPhail, who may have been the first to coin the term,
explained its meaning with a nonsense story. Two men were travelling
on a train from London to Scotland. An odd shaped package sat on the
luggage rack above their seat.
“What have you there?” asked one of the men.
“Oh, that’s a MacGuffin,” replied his companion.
“What’s a MacGuffin?”“It’s a device for trapping lions in the
Scottish Highlands.”“But there aren’t any lions in the Scottish
Highlands!”“Well, then, I guess that’s no MacGuffin!”

The MacGuffin is the engine that sets the story in motion.
-Alfred Hitchcock 1
In Alfred Hitchcock’s The Man Who Knew Too Much, 2 a married
couple becomes enmeshed in an assassination plot purely by

∗ © Nancy B. Rapoport 2013. All rights reserved.
∗∗ Interim Dean and Gordon Silver Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV.
The views in this essay are mine alone and not those of the Boyd School of Law or UNLV, as you
can probably guess from the way that the essay is written. Special thanks to the Joseph G. Miller
and William C. Becker Center for Professional Responsibility for inviting me to participate in this
symposium, and to Jeff Van Niel, Katharine Van Tassel, and Morris Rapoport for their helpful
comments.
SCREENONLINE,
1. Mark
Duguid,
Hitchcock
and
the
MacGuffin,
BFI
http://www.screenonline.org.uk/tours/hitch/tour6.html (italics added).
2. THE MAN WHO KNEW TOO MUCH (Paramount Pictures 1956).
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happenstance. 3 Although they don’t care one way or another about the
target of the plot, they have to decide whether to stop the assassination
or stand aside and let it happen. In the end, they have to weigh the
importance of helping a perfect stranger or protecting (spoiler alert!)
their son. 4
As with any Hitchcock movie, The Man Who Knew Too Much has a
MacGuffin — the motivator for the protagonist’s actions that advances
the storyline. 5 Cases have their MacGuffins, too. The clients in a case
(and their lawyers) are likely to care passionately about certain things
that, to the rest of the world, are often of no particular interest. A case’s
MacGuffin will be the focus of discovery and of argument, and clients
and lawyers alike will spend significant amounts of time debating the
MacGuffin, planning the best ways to present it, and theorizing about
any MacGuffins on the other side.
A client’s input about her 6 case — including any MacGuffins — is
crucial. In the world of “who knows the most,” the client (and the party
on the other side) will always know the most about the facts of the case;
then comes her lawyer (and the lawyer on the other side); and last comes
the judge, who really only knows those facts that the lawyers choose to
share with him. 7 Depending on the personalities and skill levels of a
client and her lawyer, there can be tension between how the lawyer
wants to present the case and how the client wants it presented. Even
though Model Rule 1.2 sets out the division of authority between the
client and the lawyer, 8 there is no clear line of demarcation. 9 The
3. Stop reading this paragraph and skip to the next one if you don’t want me to spoil the plot
for you.
4. In the first (also-Hitchcockian) version, the child in question is a daughter. The two
versions have strengths and weaknesses. The first one has Peter Lorre (as the villain) and Edna Best
(who shows real turmoil in the Albert Hall scene); the second one has Jimmy Stewart and Doris Day
as the couple caught in the middle. Doris Day tries to show the same level of anguish in the Albert
Hall scene, but she’s just not as good as Edna Best.
5. See, e.g., Duguid, supra note 1. There are several websites devoted to the various
MacGuffins in Hitchcock’s movies. See id.; see also Jeffrey Michael Bays, Definitive List of
Hitchcock MacGuffins, BORGUS.COM, http://borgus.com/hitch/macguffins.htm. For a video of
Hitchcock discussing the MacGuffin, see Interview by Dick Cavett with Alfred Hitchcock (1972),
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBRZ6GEFjG4.
6. To avoid confusion, I’m going to refer to clients as “she” and lawyers as “he.” Don’t
read anything into that choice. It’s just a convention.
7. My friend Ted Gavin has told me that being a judge is like sitting alone in a dark room
with a television, turning the television on fifteen minutes into a show, turning it off again five
minutes later, and then asking the judge to write the entire one-hour script.
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012) provides, in part, that “a lawyer
shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by
Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”
9. Id. at cmt. 2 provides:
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common wisdom is that the client decides the objectives of the
representation and the lawyer determines how best to achieve those
objectives. 10 But what happens when the client directs the lawyer to do
something unnecessary or wasteful?
I first became aware of the effect of a lawyer pursuing actions
based on pressure from his client while doing work as a bankruptcy fee
examiner. 11 Before I can describe the phenomenon in more detail,
though, let me set out the parameters that triggered my attention in the
first place.
Bankruptcy cases, like other types of fee-shifting 12 cases, often
have non-clients paying some of the legal bills. “Estate-paid”
professionals in bankruptcy can include the debtor-in-possession’s
lawyers, accountants, financial advisors, and other assorted
professionals, as well as the professionals hired by the creditors’
committee or other official committees in the case. 13 Even my own fees
and expenses as a fee examiner are paid from estate funds. (Those estate
funds are sometimes funded from a carve-out of a secured creditor’s

On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to
accomplish the client’s objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and
skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives,
particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers
usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and
concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature
of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in
question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not
prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved.
10. See, e.g., Glenn E. Bradford, Who’s Running the Show? Decision-Making in the
Courtroom in Civil and Criminal Cases, 62 J. MO. B. 148, 150 (2006).
11. I’ve been doing a fair amount of that type of work. For discussions of what I’ve found as
a fee examiner, see Nancy B. Rapoport, The Case for Value Billing in Chapter 11, 7 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 117, 149-151 (2012); Nancy B. Rapoport, Rethinking Fees in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Cases, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 263 (2010); Letter from Nancy B. Rapoport, Interim Dean and Gordon
Silver Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV, to Exec. Office of the United
States
Trustee,
(Nov.
6,
2012), available
at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo
/rules_regulations/guidelines/docs/proposed/Prof_Rapoport_Comment2.pdf; Letter from Nancy B.
Rapoport, Gordon Silver Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV, to Exec.
Office of the United States Trustee, (May 1, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/
ust/eo/rules_regulations/guidelines/docs/proposed/Prof_Rapoport_SupplementalComment.pdf;
(Dec.
14,
2011), available
at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/rules_regulations/guidelines/
docs/proposed/Prof_Rapoport_Comment.pdf.
12. For a discussion of how some bankruptcy courts have applied non-bankruptcy feeshifting cases to bankruptcy cases, see, e.g., C.R. “Chip” Bowles, Jr., Fee Enhancements: Rare and
Exceptional, 30-MAY AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 80 (2011). For a classic non-bankruptcy fee-shifting
case, see, e.g., Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010).
13. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 327, 328, 330, 331, 1102 (West 2013); see also FED. R. BANKR. P.
2014, 2016.
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collateral; in other words, part of the value of the secured creditor’s
collateral goes to pay those estate-paid professionals.) Often, though,
the funds to pay estate-paid professionals come from funds that would
otherwise be distributed to the debtor’s unsecured creditors. In that
more frequent situation, the unsecured creditors are essentially reaching
into their own pockets — on a pro rata basis — to pay those
professionals who are assisting the debtor, the creditors’ committee, and
the like. A single unsecured creditor isn’t paying the bill; the collective
group of unsecured creditors is paying that bill.
I’ve written before about what the diffusion of responsibility for
those bills does in terms of curbing their size. 14 In essence, when no
single client is responsible for paying a professional’s bills, the
likelihood that those bills will be scrutinized goes down dramatically.
There’s a big difference between the level of scrutiny that a client gives
a bill that will be paid from his own budget and the level of scrutiny that,
say, the chair of a creditors’ committee gives to a bill that reduces the
unsecured creditors’ recovery by a percent or two. Stories abound on
how general counsel are refusing to pay for the work done by summer
associates or by first- and second-year lawyers 15 and refusing to allow
firms to increase their hourly rates automatically. 16 Those general
counsel are “bill watchdogs,” but that’s because the watchdogs are
guarding their own budgets. When someone other than the client is
bearing the cost, there’s often no watchdog around. 17
The diffusion of responsibility for monitoring the estate-paid
professional’s bill is what makes me so sensitive when I review bills as a
fee examiner. Much of bankruptcy work is reactive — depending on the
actions that one party in interest takes, other parties in interest have to
react to the action with actions of their own, creating a ripple effect of
legal fees. 18 It’s a bit like watching a game of pool. A player strikes one
ball, and that ball may cause several other balls to move.
When an action is necessary, of course, many of the reactions will

14.
15.

See discussion supra note 11.
See, e.g., Ashby Jones & Joseph Palazzolo, What’s a First-Year Lawyer Worth?, WALL
ST.
J.,
Oct.
17,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970
204774604576631360989675324.html?mod=ITP_marketplace_0&cb=logged0.7879950232420504
#.
16. See, e.g., Jennifer Smith, Law Firms Face Fresh Backlash Over Fees, WALL ST. J., Oct.
22, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203400604578070611725856952.html.
17. Other than the lawyer. (And, in bankruptcy cases, the court and the Office of the United
States Trustee.).
18. The ripple effect also holds true when other estate-paid professionals (such as financial
advisors) take actions that cause reactions.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss1/6

4

Rapoport: The Client Who Did Too Much
ARTICLE 6 RAPOPORT MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

THE CLIENT WHO DID TOO MUCH

2/5/2014 2:06 PM

125

also be necessary. 19 But an unnecessary action will cause many hours of
reactions — some necessary in themselves, and possibly some that
aren’t necessary. Let’s say that a client pressures her lawyer to file an
unnecessary motion. Someone (maybe more than one party) will file an
opposition, which will in turn trigger a reply to the opposition. It’s not
an exaggeration to say that one unnecessary action — in this example,
one unnecessary motion — could trigger numerous reactions. And those
actions and reactions, of course, will generate countless hours of fees.20
Occasionally, I’ve discovered internal actions (actions only
between the client and her lawyer) that have also seemed odd. These
internal actions might never trigger reactions from the opposing party,
because they might never see the light of day; 21 nonetheless, those
actions generated unnecessary legal work. The best examples come
from my review of bills that reflected a significant amount of activity by
the client in editing the lawyer’s work product. Those edits, in turn,
required a lot of client-lawyer discussions and re-edits, and the legal fees
increased exponentially. The entries looked something like this:
Day 1 Send draft to client 0.1
Day 2 Telephone conference with client re draft 1.0
Day 3 Review and revise client’s revised draft 2.0
Day 4 Discuss revised draft with client; resend draft 0.5
Day 5 Telephone conference with client re draft 1.5
You get the point. The client was rewriting the lawyer’s draft —
and not because the draft was wrong as to any of the facts. The client
was rewriting the draft because she didn’t like some of the words that
the lawyer used in the draft. The lawyer spent unnecessary time 22
dealing with a client who wanted to play both roles (client and lawyer).
In part, the client might just have been persnickety. 23 In part, though,
the client knew that the legal bills were going to come out of someone
19. Some, though, aren’t strictly necessary, such as filing a pleading that agrees with some
other party’s position on an issue. I call those pleadings the “me, too” pleadings.
20. Even when estate-paid lawyers are dealing with necessary actions, they might do so in
wasteful ways. I’ve certainly seen examples of activity that seemed to exceed what was reasonably
necessary. For example, there’s nothing wrong with filing a statement that says “me, too” to
someone else’s motion. But there’s something wrong when a simple, two-page “me, too” statement
takes a full billable hour to draft. There’s also something wrong when a party files an eight-page
motion for stay relief for which the bill lists upwards of thirty hours. (For folks reading this essay
who aren’t familiar with stay relief motions, let’s just say that large portions of those motions can be
cribbed from stay relief motions in other cases.) But overbilling and overstaffing are two issues that
I’ve discussed elsewhere and won’t discuss here. See supra note 11.
21. Unless, of course, that lawyer submits a request to have his fees paid with estate funds.
22. And certainly more time than was reasonable.
23. Rather like law review editors who want to take out all of my contractions.
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else’s pocket. 24 My guess is that the diffusion of responsibility for those
legal fees contributed to the client’s willingness to do a line-by-line edit
of her lawyer’s work.
There has to be a way of drawing a line between normal clientlawyer interactions and those that unnecessarily drive up the fees in a
case. When the client is paying those fees herself, of course, it is her
choice as to how much extra work she wants to ask her lawyer to do. 25
But in situations in which someone other than the lawyer is paying the
client’s fees, the question of when a client should “help” the lawyer do
the lawyer’s job — or urge the lawyer to do more on a case than the
lawyer thinks is reasonable — should not be based solely on the client’s
own preferences.
There are many ways in which a client’s actions can increase her
own lawyer’s fees. She can — as some Chapter 11 clients with estatepaid professionals might want to do — urge her professionals to leave no
stone unturned. 26 Moreover, a client can call her lawyer (or e-mail, or
write to her lawyer) with a frequency that approaches obsession. Those
multiple communications can add up, especially if a lawyer charges his
minimum rate for every time that he responds to a client’s question.27
Or a client can have a vendetta against the opposing party and instruct
her lawyer to pull every (legal) trick in the book to make the litigation
24. At the symposium, Professor Susan Cable pointed out, quite correctly, that the lawyer
could have (and should have) billed the client directly for that behavior, rather than billing the
estate.
25. That’s not the end of the issue, though. Vexatious litigation and other stalling tactics
aren’t kosher, see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1-3.2 (2012), so a lawyer
shouldn’t indulge a client’s whims in a way that increases the other side’s fees unnecessarily.
26. And when lawyers are representing clients who are themselves fiduciaries for others, then
there’s a real push to leave no stone unturned. The client has duties to her beneficiary. The lawyer
has fiduciary duties to his client. As one of my favorite authors has explained in discussing a
lawyer’s fiduciary duties, “[t]here are three core aspects to fiduciary duties: a duty of loyalty, a duty
of care, and a duty of impartiality in the event of multiple beneficiaries.” Susan M. Freeman, Are
DIP and Committee Counsel Fiduciaries for Their Clients’ Constituents or the Bankruptcy Estate?
What Is a Fiduciary, Anyway?, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 291, 338-39 (2009). The duty of
loyalty places the interests of the beneficiary above that of the fiduciary. The duty of care “requires
that the fiduciary act with the care and skill that is standard in that locality for the fiduciary’s work
and level of skill.” Id. at 340. The duty of impartiality requires that — when the fiduciary has more
than one beneficiary — the fiduciary not prefer one of the beneficiaries to others. Of these three
duties, the one that’s implicated by “cover your butt” lawyering has to do with the duty of care. In
order to avoid accusations that the fiduciary didn’t do enough to protect his beneficiary, the
fiduciary might decide to do “too much” rather than risk being accused of doing too little. That
decision might be fine in terms of the duty of care, but it might not be fine in terms of keeping fees
reasonable. (Unreasonable fees, of course, could also affect the conclusion of whether the lawyer
met his duty of care.)
27. Of course, that’s a whole other ethics issue right there: charging fees for communications
that might be thirty seconds long.
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more expensive for the other side. If a lawyer’s duty is to keep his fees
reasonable, 28 does the lawyer have a corresponding obligation to control
his client’s behavior to avoid driving the bills ever upward?
The eas(ier) situation: the client as the lawyer’s scrivener.
What got me started thinking about undue client pressure on a
lawyer’s work product was the phenomenon of the client who constantly
redrafts the lawyer’s work product, combined with a lawyer who can’t
tell his client to stop micromanaging his writing. I think that the
economics of law practice today creates, or at least magnifies, that
problem. 29 As Bill Henderson explains,
[T]he legal services market is gradually being upended by new entrants
who are offering legal inputs and legal products to law firms, legal
departments, and average citizens. The principal attraction behind a
legal input or a legal product is very simple: technology or a betterdesigned process is reducing the need for expensive, artisan-trained
lawyers. In many cases, by removing the lawyer from the value chain,
cost goes down, quality goes up, and service delivery time becomes
faster.

This is a paradigm shift. 30
When the demand for legal services goes down, then the client’s
ability to exert extra influence on the size and composition of her legal
fees goes up. 31 Law firms get squeezed, and they become increasingly
nervous about losing their clients’ business. If most top law firms (big
or small) have well-credentialed, hard-working, smart lawyers, then it’s
difficult for them to compete on the basis that “our lawyers are better
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2012).
29. For a good discussion of the changes, see, e.g., William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for
Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 461-462 (2013); Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But
Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 92 (2011).
30. Henderson, supra note 29, at 479 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). Law
schools are reacting to this paradigm shift. They’re cutting their entering class sizes, and they’re
trying to create incubators in which their recent graduates can work. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Top
ST.
J.,
Mar.
11,
2013,
Law
School
Cuts
Admissions,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324281004578354490114584144.html;
Ethan
Bronner, To Place Graduates, Law Schools Are Opening Firms, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/education/law-schools-look-to-medical-educationmodel.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
31. More and more clients are refusing to pay for first- and second-year associates’ work, for
summer associates’ work, and for automatic billing increases. See, e.g., Claire Zillman, Law Firm
Leaders Survey 2010: The New Normal, AM. LAW. (ONLINE) (Dec. 1, 2010); see also David Segal,
What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-belawyers.html?_r=3&pagewanted=1&ref=business.
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than their lawyers.” It’s like Lake Wobegon: all the lawyers are strong
(and good-looking). 32 If all of the potential lawyers are good, then
they’d best be competing on the basis of providing faster and more
complete 33 service. 34
But the problem with trying to “out-service” the other law firms by
catering to clients is that, sometimes, a client is flat-out wrong. We’ve
seen frivolous lawsuits that a lawyer never should have filed — but for
greed. 35 We’ve seen deals go through that make no long-term economic
sense — except for greed. And we’ve seen lawyers kowtow to clients
32. The closing line to Garrison Keillor’s Prairie Home Companion public radio show is:
“Well, that’s the news from Lake Wobegon, where all the women are strong, all the men are good
looking, and all the children are above average.” See generally Mitch Tuchman, The Investment
(Mar.
8,
2013),
News
From
‘Lake
Wobegon,’
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mitchelltuchman/2013/03/08/the-investment-news-from-lakewobegon/ (explaining the origin of the oft-cited closing line and what has become known as “the
Lake Wobegon effect”).
33. I was going to say “more obsequious,” but my husband stopped me.
34. Professor Katharine Van Tassel, who was kind enough to read an earlier draft of this
essay, suggested an intriguing analogy to health care. She taught me that there are two types of
“overuse” concepts that might relate to “overlawyering”: supply-sensitive overuse and preferencesensitive overuse. As Professor Van Tassel explained to me:
Supply-sensitive care is care for which the supply of a specific resource (for example,
number of physicians, hospital beds or specialized testing equipment) heavily influences
the customary amount of care provided . . . . This type of overuse is linked to the ‘more
is better’ myth . . . . Preference-sensitive care occurs when a condition has multiple
possible treatment options, each with its own benefits and risks, and the type of care
depends on the physician’s preference . . . .
E-mail from Katharine A. Van Tassel, Professor, The Univ. of Akron School of Law, to author
(Mar. 27, 2013) (on file with author). I think the overlawyering that I’m describing has elements of
both supply-sensitivity and preference-sensitivity. The “more is better” sensitivity is what
encourages fiduciaries (e.g., debtors in possession, creditors’ committees) to tell their lawyers to
leave no stone unturned. If someone else is paying the lawyers’ bills, then the only limitation on the
supply of legal work is the 24-hour day. But see Jason Beahm, Lawyer Bills More Than 24 Hours a
Day, Gets Suspended, STRATEGIST L. BLOG (Aug. 26, 2010, 5:58 AM),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/strategist/2010/08/lawyer-bills-more-than-24-hours-a-day-getssuspended.html (describing a situation where the Ohio Supreme Court disciplined an attorney for
billing more than 24 hours in a day). Preference-sensitivity, in overlawyering terms, would relate to
someone’s choice to behave in a scorched-earth fashion, rather than to behave reasonably at first.
The lawyer whose client protests that he’s “not being mean enough and should yell more at the
other side” is dealing with preference sensitivity. In addition to teaching me about the two types of
sensitivity, Professor Van Tassel coined the word “MacGuffinitus,” which tickles me pink.
35. Many states have enacted statutes to deal with frivolous litigation, cf. Kenneth S. Klein,
Removing the Blindfold and Tipping the Scales: The Unintended Lesson of Ashcroft v. Iqbal Is That
Frivolous Lawsuits May Be Important to Our Nation, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 593, 597-98 (2010)
(discussing statutes that are attempts to curb frivolous litigation); but as long as there are clients
who pressure lawyers to pursue it (or greedy lawyers who find clients willing to let them pursue it),
we’re going to keep having frivolous litigation. (The sad thing is that a lot of meritorious litigation
gets swept under the “frivolous” rug because of the way that some news stories portray some
lawsuits.)
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who want their lawyers to drive up the other side’s fees and expenses as
a way of pressuring the other side to give in. The common refrain of
those clients? “If you won’t do what I’m asking, I’ll find another lawyer
who will.” And often those clients are right. There are lawyers who
“will.”
There’s a difference between catering to a client’s legitimate
requests and simply kowtowing to that client out of the fear of losing the
client’s business. The hard part is figuring out exactly where the line is
between those two options. My theory is that, at least for clients who are
not law-trained themselves, a part of that line is where the client is
“playing lawyer” with the lawyer’s drafts. We absolutely need clients to
verify the facts on which our work product is based, and we absolutely
need clients to communicate their goals for the representation. What we
don’t need is a client who goes through a line-by-line edit of a lawyer’s
draft to change “because” to “whereas” because “whereas” sounds more
“lawyerly.” 36
Again, if the client’s paying the bill and wants to “play lawyer” —
and the client’s choices aren’t affecting the opposing party — that’s a
different matter. When the client isn’t paying the bill, though, we’ve
lost the checks and balances that help to keep fees reasonable. Charging
someone else for the pleasure of doing stylistic edits on the lawyer’s
draft is a clear waste of time. It’s also a misallocation of costs, precisely
because the client isn’t paying the bill.
So why do lawyers let their clients pick up the red pen for
wordsmithing purposes, no matter who’s paying the bill? The lawyers
who don’t push back likely are feeling the heat from their partners to
keep fees coming in. In this economy, with the significant changes in
how clients are getting legal services, some firms are just running
scared. That doesn’t make the behavior right, but it does help to explain
it. Let’s assume that there’s a continuum of lawyer behavior that ranges
from the lawyer taking actions to achieve the client’s legitimate
objectives to the lawyer taking actions because the client is bullying him
into it. The ends of the continuum are legitimate actions on one side and
36. The tougher situation is where the non-law-trained client first makes some reasonable
suggestions, then starts to suggest more things that smack of stylistic editing, and eventually
develops a habit of editing everything that the lawyer sends her way. At some point, the lawyer will
start asking himself why he’s negotiating word choices with his client. When should the lawyer
say, “You know — someone else is going to end up paying my fees on this matter, so perhaps we
should try to keep them as reasonable as possible?” I don’t mean to suggest that, just because
someone other than the client is paying a lawyer’s fees, the lawyer should put the payor’s interests
above the client’s interests. A lawyer shouldn’t do that. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.8(f), 1.7 cmt. 13 (2012).
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wholly unjustified actions on the other side.

When I’ve asked lawyers why they continued to let their clients do
line-edits of drafts when it was clear that the clients were just
wordsmithing, I generally heard that the client was a bully who wanted
to exert control over the lawyer in as many ways as she could: “I just
felt that I couldn’t say no.” To me, that response demonstrates the
increased pressure on lawyers because of the changes in law practice.
It’s easy to say no when you have an unlimited number of clients. When
you see your client base dwindle, it’s not. 37
37. In a declining legal market, there are very few levers that a firm can pull to keep itself out
of the red — and lots of fixed costs, including payroll. As the salaries of first-year associates started
climbing upward to $160,000 at some of the biggest firms, those firms locked themselves into a
spiral of having to raise their rates (or come up with other ways to maintain those ever-growing
payrolls) or let workers go to make ends meet. And it’s not just the starting salaries of first-year
associates that hemmed in many law firms. Giving partners guaranteed draws of more than their
books of business brought in certainly didn’t help, and that was one of the factors that led to the
demise of Dewey & LeBoeuf. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Files for Bankruptcy,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/dewey-leboeuf-files-forbankruptcy/; Martha Neil, Ex-Partner Blames Legal Recruiters, Excessive Pay Guarantees, Angry
J.
(May
10,
2012),
Colleagues
for
Dewey’s
Downfall,
ABA
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/former_partner_blames_legal_recruiters_excessive_pay_g
uarantees_for_dewey/.
The problem with high fixed costs in a competitive legal market is that something,
eventually, has to give: either salaries have to go down, or collection of accounts receivable must go
up. Even the most prestigious firms are starting to feel pushback on their rates from many of their
clients, see, e.g., Burk & McGowan, supra note 29, and those sky-high starting salaries are
beginning to come back down to earth, see, e.g., Median Private Practice Starting Salaries for the
Class of 2011 Plunge as Private Practice Jobs Continue to Erode, NALP (July 12, 2012), available
at http://www.nalp.org/classof2011_salpressrel; Ashley Post, Median Starting Salaries Plummet,
INSIDECOUNSEL (July 13, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/07/13/median-startingsalaries-plummet; Ashley Post, Median First-Year Associate Salaries Drop to $145,000,
INSIDECOUNSEL (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/09/21/median-first-year-
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The problem with a lawyer who feels constrained from saying no to
a bully is that the lawyers (and their clients) on the other side can be
affected, too. In my experience, a client who bullies her own lawyer will
try to bully the other side as well. Bullying behavior means that
reaching agreement on a settlement or a transaction takes exponentially
longer because the bully, well, just likes to order people around.
The other explanation that I’ve heard from lawyers who let their
clients encroach on decisions that should normally be the lawyer’s
prerogative is that the client became obsessed with the case and wanted
to stay as involved in it as humanly possible. Let’s call that explanation
the “MacGuffin phenomenon”: there’s something embedded in the
client’s case about which the client cares deeply but which isn’t essential
to the legal posture of the case. The client wants to obsess over the
MacGuffin. The lawyer (the audience) just wants to move the case (the
plot) along. In either the “bullying client” or “obsessing client”
scenarios, there has to be a point at which the lawyer knows that he’s
wasting time. My guess is that, at the time the lawyer notices the wasted
time, a heck of a lot of already wasted time has passed. To make matters
worse, in the situation in which an estate-paid lawyer has wasted some
time, that lawyer’s likely not to be paid for those wasted hours.
Bankruptcy courts only allow reasonable fees for estate-paid
professionals. 38 Unreasonable fees, then, don’t get paid from estate
funds. The lawyer’s gotten squeezed from both ends: The client has
persuaded the lawyer to waste time, and the court has determined that
the wasted time won’t be compensated. 39
I want to focus on the middle-to-left part of the continuum: where
the client persuades the lawyer to take actions that aren’t completely
necessary but aren’t obviously unnecessary, either. There’s no good

associate-salaries-drop-to-14500; Debra Cassens Weiss, Think $160K Is the Standard BigLaw
J.
(Sept.
20,
2012),
Salary?
Think
Again,
NALP
Says,
ABA
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/think_160k_is_the_standard_biglaw_salary_think_again_n
alp_says/. Even when the starting salaries are staying flat, firms are reacting by hiring fewer
associates and more contract-type attorneys. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Firms Express
J.
(June
22,
2010),
‘Growing
Enthusiasm’
for
Contract
Lawyers,
ABA
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_firms_express_growing_enthusiasm_for_contract_law
yers/.
38. See Bowles, Jr., supra note 12, at 80.
39. The client in a bankruptcy case who wants a scorched-earth lawyer is likely pressuring
the lawyer to do more because extra legal work on the client’s behalf (the action) will cost the other
side legal fees as well (the reaction) or gain the client some other coveted advantage. In an
economy in which clients are exerting significant leverage, as long as there’s one professional out
there willing to do the dirty work, there will be other lawyers who will bow to the client’s wishes.
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ethics rule for that situation, although the rule regarding withdrawal 40
comes the closest. Even though we can’t put our fingers on precisely the
moment at which a client’s request goes from reasonable to
unreasonable, we’ve all experienced the realization that something that a
client wants us to do is probably not the best idea in the world.

How can a lawyer whose gut says that he should push back on a client’s
request justify pushing back when he’s likely to lose that client to
another lawyer willing to comply with the client’s request? I’m asking
that question while knowing full well that, even in the best of
circumstances, lawyers — who are people first 41 — can talk themselves
into believing that a client request that makes them uncomfortable is
actually quite reasonable when they think about it some more. Even
smart people can talk themselves into just about anything. 42
This issue may be one for which there’s no solution, other than
asking lawyers to be hyper-aware of the pressures being put on them to
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2012); especially R. 1.16(b)(4) (withdrawal
when “the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement”).
41. No matter what the lawyer jokes say.
42. There’s lots of good social science literature on this point, much of which I’ve cadged for
some of my articles, including Nancy B. Rapoport, Black Swans, Ostriches, and Ponzi Schemes, 42
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 627 (2012); Nancy B. Rapoport, The Curious Incident of the Law Firm
That Did Nothing in the Night-Time, 10 LEGAL ETHICS 98 (2007) (reviewing MILTON C. REGAN,
JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004)), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017627; see also Rapoport, supra note 11 (The
Case for Value Billing in Chapter 11 and Rethinking Fees in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases).
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take some action that might be unnecessary and wasteful.43 At least
when a third party has the opportunity to weigh in on an action’s
reasonableness — as a bankruptcy court does in determining whether to
award fees to an estate-paid individual — there’s a chance that a
lawyer’s future decisions might be altered. 44 (My guess is that it’s a
slim chance, though; operant conditioning 45 might work for some
people, some of the time, but it clearly doesn’t work for all lawyers
whose fees have been denied because of their unreasonableness.)
What’s more likely to change behavior is when a whole lot of legal fees
go unpaid by the clients who asked for the unnecessary work because, in
retrospect, the clients themselves didn’t want to pay for work that ended
up being wasteful. When the client decides to give up on her own
MacGuffin, either because she’s had a change of heart or because her
lawyer has persuaded her that the MacGuffin really is a “nothing,” 46
that’s when we might see some real change.

43. Some strategy decisions can be so expensive that they pile up legal fees the size of those
in Dickens’s BLEAK HOUSE. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Bantam Classics 1985).
44. State bars also may weigh in, if the issue of the reasonableness of fees comes before
them. See Phil Pattee, Client Chooses the Destination, But You Drive the Boat, 14 NEV. LAW. 34,
34 (2006):
Many ethics complaints to the State Bar come from disgruntled clients who claim their
cases were lost because the lawyer was incompetent. Unfortunately, we often find that
the attorney acquiesced to the client’s weird legal theories and followed a flawed course
of litigation to defeat. Although the underlying cause is a backbone problem as well as
an ethics problem, the outcome remains a disciplinary and/or malpractice problem.
45. For a definition of “operant conditioning,” see, e.g., Operant Conditioning, ALLEYDOG,
http://www.alleydog.com/glossary/definition.php?term=Operant%20Conditioning (a website
designed to help students learn about psychology).
46. See Duguid, supra note 1.
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